

Determining our Destiny: Supplemental Analyses

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Supplemental Table 1. Sample demographics of Study 1

Demographic Criteria	Percentage (%)
<u>Gender</u>	
Males	22.7
Females	77.3
<u>Age</u>	
18 to 24 years	21.6
25 to 29 years	11.9
30 to 34 years	7.00
35 to 44 years	15.20
45 to 54 years	14.20
55 to 64 years	18.70
65 years and over	7.50
<u>House Hold Income (Monthly Before Tax)</u>	
\$250 or less	2.60
\$250-500	3.20
\$500-\$750	4.20
\$750 - \$1,000	10.30
\$1,000-\$1,250	7.40
\$1,250-\$1,500	8.10
\$1,500-\$2,000	13.20
\$2,000-\$2,500	14.20
\$2,500 +	36.70
<u>Education</u>	
Less than High School	2.90
High school graduate	20.10
Some college or associate's degree	40.50
Bachelor's degree	23.60
Advanced degree	13.00

Supplemental Table 2. Multivariate and univariate regression results of Study 1 including additional illegitimacy item

Multivariate Statistics	Pillais' Trace	F Statistic		
		DF(3, 282)		
Intercept	.38***	58.20		
Collective Autonomy Restriction	.16***	18.28		
Illegitimacy of Group Position	.15***	16.40		
Illegitimacy Additional Item	.14***	15.56		
Group Identification	.08***	7.82		

Univariate Statistics	Collective Action Support	Support of Black Power Movement	System Justification
	<i>b</i> (95% CI)	<i>b</i> (95% CI)	<i>b</i> (95% CI)
Intercept	1.50*** (0.77, 2.24)	-20.34 (-44.98, 4.30)	3.99*** (3.26, 4.72)
Collective Autonomy Restriction	0.21*** (0.13, 0.29)	7.03*** (3.87, 10.18)	-0.17*** (-0.27, -0.08)
Illegitimacy of Group Position	0.26*** (0.18, 0.33)	1.22 (-1.74, 4.18)	-0.15*** (-0.24, -0.07)
Illegitimacy Additional Item	0.11** (0.03, 0.18)		
Group Identification		3.55* (0.60, 6.50)	0.20*** (0.12, 0.29)

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Supplemental Table 3: Multicollinearity and other statistical assumptions for Study 1

Multicollinearity Values (VIF) For Independent Variables	Collective Autonomy Restriction	Illegitimacy	Group Identification
Collective Autonomy Restriction	-	1.01	1.01
Illegitimacy of Group Position	1.06	-	1.06
Group Identification	1.10	1.10	-

Assumptions for Dependent Variables	Skewness (Z-score)	Kurtosis	Linearity Assumption (P-P plot of Residuals)	Homogeneity of Variance (Residual by Predicted Value)	Normality of Residual (Shapiro Wilk)	Std. Residual [range]	Cook's Distance [range]	Mahalanobis Distance
Collective Action Support	-4.28	-.53	Valid	Some heteroscedasticity	.99, $p=.011$	-3.81, 2.25	0.00, .145	-.03, 14.37
Support for Black Power Movement	2.08	-4.44	Some bowing/slippage	Some heteroscedasticity	.96, $p<.001$	-1.79, 2.33	0.00, .029	-.03, 14.37
System Justification	1.18	-.75	Valid	Valid	.99, $p=.011$	-2.59, 2.711	0, .06	-.03, 14.37

Note. Multicollinearity values < 3 indicates acceptable levels of multicollinearity. Acceptable range for Skewness and Kurtosis [-1.96, 1.96]; acceptable range for Std. Residuals [-3.00, 3.00]; acceptable range for Cook's Distance [0, 1.00]. No cases had Mahalanobis distance scores which passed the critical chi-square threshold to be a multivariate outlier.

Supplemental Table 4: Robust linear univariate regression with M-estimator (Huber function) and 95% bias-corrected boot-strapping intervals (5,000 samples) – Study 1

	Collective Action Support <i>b</i> (95% CI)	Support for Black Power Movement <i>b</i> (95% CI)	System Justification <i>b</i> (95% CI)
Intercept	2.18*** (1.54, 2.89)	-15.06 (-23.24, 29.38)	4.64*** (4.09, 5.59)
Collective Autonomy Restriction	.23*** (.13, .32)	7.07*** (2.09, 8.67)	-.21*** (-.36, -.16)
Illegitimacy of Group Position	.27*** (.17, .37)	.93 (-3.35, 2.86)	-.19*** (-.28, -.10)
Group Identification	.14** (.04, .24)	2.82 (-1.71, 5.08)	.14** (.04, .23)

Note. $\lambda p < .10$, $*p < .05$, $**p < .01$, $***p < .001$.

Supplemental Table 5: Study 1 confirmatory factor analysis comparing model fit between one-factor and two-factor models for collective autonomy restriction (CAR) and potentially overlapping variables

	Two Factor Model (<i>CFI</i> ; <i>SRMR</i> ; <i>RMSEA</i>)	One Factor Model (<i>CFI</i> ; <i>SRMR</i> ; <i>RMSEA</i>)	Model comparison ($\Delta\chi^2$, <i>p</i>)
CAR and Illegitimacy of Group Position	<i>CFI</i> =.97; <i>SRMR</i> =.03; <i>RMSEA</i> =.08	<i>CFI</i> =.93; <i>SRMR</i> =.07; <i>RMSEA</i> =.12	$\Delta\chi^2=75.27$ <i>p</i> <.001
CAR and Group Identification	<i>CFI</i> =.97; <i>SRMR</i> =.04; <i>RMSEA</i> =.07	<i>CFI</i> =.74; <i>SRMR</i> =.16; <i>RMSEA</i> =.20	$\Delta\chi^2=553.7$, <i>p</i> <.001

Supplemental Table 6. Sample demographics of Study 2 (Black Americans indicated in 2 left-most columns; White Americans indicated in 2 right-most columns)

Demographic Criteria	Demographics of 2010 US Census (%) - Black Americans	Observed Demographics of Present Sample - Black Americans	Demographics of 2010 US Census (%) - White Americans	Observed Demographics of Present Sample - White Americans
<u>Gender</u>				
Males	50.00	49.66	50.00	49.66
Females	50.00	50.34	50.00	50.34
<u>Age</u>				
18 to 24 years	21.81	26.03	15.42	14.63
25 to 29 years	9.99	12.33	7.83	7.82
30 to 34 years	8.80	11.64	7.11	7.14
35 to 44 years	17.35	19.18	15.42	15.65
45 to 54 years	18.13	13.36	19.04	19.05
55 to 64 years	12.61	11.99	16.27	16.67
65 years and over	11.30	5.48	18.79	19.05
<u>Region</u>				
Northeast	17.50	19.52	19.40	20.75
Midwest	17.70	20.21	26.60	28.23
South	55.60	50.34	34.50	33.33
West	9.30	9.93	19.60	17.69
<u>House Hold Income</u>				
Under \$14,999	23.50	19.86	9.60	10.54
\$15,000 to \$19,999	8.00	5.48	5.40	6.12
\$20,000 to \$24,999	7.40	7.88	5.70	7.48
\$25,000 to \$34,999	13.40	14.04	10.30	11.22
\$35,000 to \$49,999	14.60	15.75	14.00	13.95
\$50,000 to \$74,999	15.10	18.49	18.80	21.09
\$75,000 to \$99,999	8.70	10.27	12.40	12.24
\$100,000 and over	9.30	8.22	22.90	17.35
<u>Education</u>				
Less than High School	15.90	6.51	8.00	4.76
High school graduate	35.20	36.99	31.60	34.01
Some college or associate's degree	29.20	30.82	27.20	27.55
Bachelor's degree	13.30	17.81	21.40	21.77
Advanced degree	6.50	7.88	11.90	11.90

Supplemental Table 7: Study 2 confirmatory factor analysis comparing model fit between one-factor and two-factor models for collective autonomy restriction (CAR) and potentially overlapping variables

Black Americans	Two Factor Model (<i>CFI</i> ; <i>SRMR</i> ; <i>RMSEA</i>)	One Factor Model (<i>CFI</i> ; <i>SRMR</i> ; <i>RMSEA</i>)	Model comparison ($\Delta\chi^2$, <i>p</i>)
CAR and Group ID	<i>CFI</i> =.96; <i>SRMR</i> =.04; <i>RMSEA</i> =.09	<i>CFI</i> =.80; <i>SRMR</i> =.12; <i>RMSEA</i> =.19	$\Delta\chi^2=383.47$, <i>p</i> <.001
CAR and Group Agency	<i>CFI</i> =.95; <i>SRMR</i> =.05; <i>RMSEA</i> =.09	<i>CFI</i> =.74; <i>SRMR</i> =.21; <i>RMSEA</i> =.17	$\Delta\chi^2=542.64$, <i>p</i> <.001
CAR and Discrimination	<i>CFI</i> =.95; <i>SRMR</i> =.04; <i>RMSEA</i> =.09	<i>CFI</i> =.94; <i>SRMR</i> =.05; <i>RMSEA</i> =.10	$\Delta\chi^2=29.31$, <i>p</i> <.001
CAR and Relative Deprivation	<i>CFI</i> =.96; <i>SRMR</i> =.05; <i>RMSEA</i> =.09	<i>CFI</i> =.79; <i>SRMR</i> =.12; <i>RMSEA</i> =.19	$\Delta\chi^2=426.68$ <i>p</i> <.001
White Americans	Two Factor Model (<i>CFI</i> ; <i>SRMR</i> ; <i>RMSEA</i>)	One Factor Model (<i>CFI</i> ; <i>SRMR</i> ; <i>RMSEA</i>)	Model comparison ($\Delta\chi^2$, <i>p</i>)
CAR and Group ID	<i>CFI</i> =.97; <i>SRMR</i> =.05; <i>RMSEA</i> =.09	<i>CFI</i> =.88; <i>SRMR</i> =.12; <i>RMSEA</i> =.19	$\Delta\chi^2=344.86$, <i>p</i> <.001
CAR and Group Agency	<i>CFI</i> =.98; <i>SRMR</i> =.03; <i>RMSEA</i> =.08	<i>CFI</i> =.26; <i>SRMR</i> =.49; <i>RMSEA</i> =.46	$\Delta\chi^2=3251.1$, <i>p</i> <.001
CAR and Discrimination	<i>CFI</i> =.98; <i>SRMR</i> =.02; <i>RMSEA</i> =.08	<i>CFI</i> =.96; <i>SRMR</i> =.05; <i>RMSEA</i> =.12	$\Delta\chi^2=106.35$, <i>p</i> <.001
CAR and Relative Deprivation	<i>CFI</i> =.98; <i>SRMR</i> =.03; <i>RMSEA</i> =.08	<i>CFI</i> =.82; <i>SRMR</i> =.15; <i>RMSEA</i> =.22	$\Delta\chi^2=658.45$ <i>p</i> <.001

Supplemental Table 8. Study 2 intercorrelations between collective autonomy restrictions, general collective action support, specific collective action support, desire for group power, system justification, Protestant work ethic, relative deprivation of scarce resources, anti-group discrimination, group identification, and group agency (combining both races)

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Collective Autonomy Restriction	4.67	1.84	1	.74***	.72***	.64***	-.11*	.26***	.65***	.74***	.47***	0.05
2. General Collective Action Support	4.76	1.90		1	.77***	.740**	-0.02	.26***	.66***	.71***	.59***	.13***
3. Specific Collective Action Support	4.60	1.88			1	.63*** *	-0.02	.27***	.62***	.66***	.54***	0.03
4. Desire for Group Power	4.81	1.79				1	-.10*	.19***	.62***	.57***	.50***	.19***
5. System Justification	3.49	1.10					1	.40***	-.22***	-.15***	0.06	0.05
6. Protestant Work Ethic	4.55	1.04						1	0.05	.19***	.15***	0.06
7. Relative Deprivation of Scarce Resources	3.90	2.06							1	.66***	.41***	-0.06
8. Anti-Group Discrimination	5.13	1.68								1	.39***	-0.06
9. Group Identification	4.93	1.59									1	.29***
10. Group Agency	4.96	1.50										1

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Supplemental Table 9. Unstandardized slope coefficients (*b*) and 95% confidence intervals for univariate regressions pertaining to Study 2

Main Effects	Desire for Power	General Collective Action	Specific Collective Action General	System Justification	Protestant Work Ethic
	<i>b</i> (95% CI)	<i>b</i> (95% CI)	<i>b</i> (95% CI)	<i>b</i> (95% CI)	<i>b</i> (95% CI)
Intercept	4.82*** (4.70, 4.93)	4.90*** (4.80, 5.00)	4.74*** (4.63, 4.85)	3.70*** (3.61, 3.80)	4.70*** (4.61, 4.79)
Collective Autonomy Restriction (CAR)	0.29*** (0.20, 0.37)	0.26*** (0.19, 0.34)	0.31*** (0.23, 0.40)	-0.06 (-0.14, 0.01)	0.10** (0.03, 0.17)
Racial Group	0.30*** (0.16, 0.44)	0.33*** (0.21, 0.45)	-0.11 (-0.24, 0.03)	-0.06 (-0.17, 0.06)	-0.24*** (-0.35, -0.13)
CAR by Group Interaction	0.08 (-0.02, 0.17)	0.23*** (0.15, 0.31)	0.20*** (0.11, 0.29)	-0.09* (-0.16, -0.01)	0.07 (-0.01, 0.14)
Anti-Group Discrimination	0.18*** (0.10, 0.26)	0.13*** (0.07, 0.20)	0.21*** (0.14, 0.29)	-0.07* (-0.14, -0.01)	-0.01 (-0.07, 0.05)
Relative Deprivation	0.16*** (0.09, 0.24)	0.29*** (0.23, 0.36)	0.29*** (0.22, 0.36)	0.15*** (0.09, 0.22)	0.06* (0.004, 0.12)
Group Identification	0.17*** (0.10, 0.24)	0.10*** (0.04, 0.16)	-0.005 (-0.07, 0.06)	0.03 (-0.03, 0.09)	0.06* (0.002, 0.11)
Group Agency	-0.004 (-0.07, 0.06)	-0.15*** (-0.21, -0.10)	-0.16*** (-0.23, -0.10)	-0.24*** (-0.30, -0.19)	-0.17*** (-0.22, -0.11)

Simple Effects	Desire for Power	General Collective Action	Specific Collective Action General	System Justification	Protestant Work Ethic
	<i>b</i> (95% CI)	<i>b</i> (95% CI)	<i>b</i> (95% CI)	<i>b</i> (95% CI)	<i>b</i> (95% CI)
Simple Effects for Black Americans	0.28*** (.16, .41)	0.11* (.005, .21)	0.15* (.03, .27)	-0.30*** (-.41, -.20)	-0.06 (-.16, .03)
Simple Effects for White Americans	0.29*** (0.19, 0.39)	0.42*** (0.34, 0.50)	0.47*** (0.38, 0.56)	0.18*** (0.09, 0.26)	0.27*** (0.19, 0.34)

Note. **p* < .05, ***p* < .01, ****p* < .001. Race was coded White = -1 and Black = +1. All other predictors in the model were grand-mean-centered.

Supplemental Table 10: Multicollinearity and other statistical assumptions for Study 2

Multicollinearity Values (VIF) for Independent Variables	Collective Autonomy Restriction	Group ID	Group Agency	Discrimination	Relative Deprivation
Collective Autonomy Restriction	-	1.42	1.14	1.83	1.87
Group ID	2.50	-	1.03	2.53	1.97
Group Agency	2.60	1.32	-	2.50	2.00
Discrimination	1.88	1.48	1.14	-	1.82
Relative Deprivation	2.41	1.43	1.13	2.27	-

Assumptions for Dependent Variables	Skewness (Z-score)	Kurtosis	Linearity Assumption (P-P plot of Residuals)	Homogeneity of Variance (Residual by Predicted Value)	Normality of Residual (Shapiro Wilk)	Std. Residual [range]	Cook's Distance [range]	Mahal. Distance [Range]
Desire for Power	-5.10	-3.00	Slippage/bowing	Heteroscedasticity	.92, $p < .001$	-4.15-3.41	.00, .05	.26, 29.59
Collective Action	-4.89	-4.45	Slippage/bowing	Heteroscedasticity	.91, $p < .001$	-3.43-3.12	.00, .04	.26, 29.59
Support General								
Collective Action Specific	-4.20	-4.29	Slippage/bowing	Heteroscedasticity	.93, $p < .001$	-3.71-2.99	0.00, .07	.26, 29.59
PWE	-1.44	1.01	valid	valid	1.00, $p = .100$	-3.06, 2.94	.00, .04	.26, 29.59
System Justification	-.28	-3.02	valid	valid	.99, $p < .001$	-2.36, 2.62	.00, .03	.26, 29.59

Note. Multicollinearity values < 3 indicates acceptable levels of multicollinearity. Acceptable range for Skewness and Kurtosis [-1.96, 1.96]; acceptable range for Std. Residuals [-3.00, 3.00]; acceptable range for Cook's Distance [0, 1.00].

Supplemental Table 11: Study 2 multivariate analysis excluding Mahalanobis distance outliers.

	Pillais' Trace	<i>F</i> Statistic Df (5,568)
Intercept	.98	4615.49***
Race	.12	15.90***
Collective Autonomy Restriction (CAR)	.16	20.85***
Race x CAR interaction	.16	21.71***
Relative Deprivation	.08	10.17***
Anti-Group Discrimination	.08	9.55***
Group Identification	.18	25.05***
Group Agency	.05	5.65***

*Note.**** $p < .001$

Supplemental Table 12: Study 2 multigroup structural equation model conducted using maximum likelihood estimation with robust (Huber-White) standard errors to correct for potential violations to non-normality

	Black Americans		White Americans	
	Est w/stars	p-value	Est w/stars	p-value
	<u>Regression Slopes</u>			
<u>Desire Power</u>				
Collective Autonomy Restriction	0.24(0.08)**	.002	0.33(0.07)***	.000
Discrimination	0.19(0.07)**	.005	0.06(0.08)	.471
Relative Deprivation	0.22(0.05)***	.000	0.16(0.06)*	.010
GID	0.19(0.06)***	.001	0.14(0.07)*	.044
Agency	0.02(0.04)	.557	0.30(0.07)***	.000
<u>Collective Action General</u>				
Collective Autonomy Restriction	0.12(0.08)	.125	0.42(0.06)***	.000
Discrimination	0.30(0.07)***	.000	0.20(0.06)**	.002
Relative Deprivation	0.10(0.05)	.054	0.19(0.05)***	.000
GID	0.28(0.06)***	.000	0.30(0.05)***	.000
Agency	0.05(0.04)	.211	0.16(0.05)***	.001
<u>Collective Action Specific</u>				
Collective Autonomy Restriction	0.13(0.08)	.097	0.49(0.05)***	.000
Discrimination	0.20(0.08)**	.009	0.17(0.07)**	.008
Relative Deprivation	0.12(0.06)	.051	0.30(0.06)***	.000
GID	0.44(0.06)***	.000	0.17(0.05)***	.000
Agency	0.00(0.05)	.933	-0.02(0.05)	.723
<u>System Justification</u>				
Collective Autonomy Restriction	-0.16(0.05)***	.001	0.07(0.06)	.232
Discrimination	-0.26(0.06)***	.000	-0.01(0.06)	.811
Relative Deprivation	-0.17(0.04)***	.000	0.04(0.06)	.494
GID	0.08(0.04)	.053	0.23(0.05)***	.000
Agency	0.13(0.04)***	.001	-0.01(0.05)	.884
<u>PWE</u>				
Collective Autonomy Restriction	0.01(0.05)	.865	0.20(0.04)***	.000
Discrimination	-0.10(0.05)	.062	0.13(0.05)**	.009
Relative Deprivation	-0.08(0.04)	.074	0.05(0.05)	.309
GID	0.08(0.06)	.187	0.06(0.04)	.123
Agency	0.15(0.05)**	.002	-0.00(0.04)	.903

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. The unconstrained model was fully saturated, $\chi^2(0) = 0$.

Supplemental Table 13: Multigroup multilevel structural equation model comparing Study 3 effects across the two years Study 3 was conducted

	<u>Year 1 (N=209)</u>			<u>Year 2 (N=178)</u>		
	Est	SE	p-value	Est	SE	p-value
Desire for Power						
Regression Slopes						
Dummy1	0.25	0.50	0.619	0.45	0.43	0.305
Dummy2	0.62	0.45	0.166	0.22	0.40	0.573
Col Aut Restriction (group mean)	0.43**	0.16	0.009	0.36*	0.16	0.026
Col Aut Restriction (group mean centered score)	0.29**	0.10	0.003	0.49***	0.09	0.000
GID	-0.01	0.11	0.913	0.09	0.13	0.489
Group Agency	0.28**	0.09	0.002	0.05	0.13	0.711
Col Aut Restriction (group mean)						
Dummy1	-2.63***	0.16	0.000	-2.26***	0.20	0.000
Dummy2	-2.41***	0.19	0.000	-2.57***	0.17	0.000
GID	0.04	0.04	0.328	0.09	0.07	0.165
Group Agency	0.04	0.03	0.179	-0.10	0.06	0.119
GID						
Dummy1	-0.08	0.15	0.598	0.06	0.19	0.767
Dummy2	-0.00	0.14	0.993	0.38*	0.18	0.034
Group Agency						
Dummy1	-0.10	-0.10	0.636	0.37	0.23	0.109
Dummy2	0.08	0.08	0.661	0.36 ⁺	0.21	0.083
Total and Indirect Effects						
Indirect Effect Dummy1	-1.13**	0.43	0.009	-0.81*	0.38	0.032
Indirect Effect Dummy2	-1.03**	0.39	0.009	-0.92*	0.43	0.031
Total Effect Dummy1	-0.88***	0.19	0.000	-0.37	0.27	0.174
Total Effect Dummy2	-0.41 ⁺	0.23	0.067	-0.70*	0.28	0.012

Note. Results pertain to one simultaneous structural equation model. The model fitted was identical to the model described in the main text, however, it was conducted as a multigroup SEM in which year was treated as the grouping variable. Parameters shown are for the unconstrained model. The unconstrained model had good model fit (Robust *CFI* = 1.00; robust *SRMR* = .025; robust *RMSEA* = .00, 90% CI [.00, .00]; robust *BIC* = 5804.13). Providing evidence for consistency across both years, the unconstrained model did not have significantly improved fit relative to a constrained model in which all path coefficients were held to equality across the two years, (Robust *CFI* = 1.00; robust *SRMR* = .058; robust *RMSEA* = .00, 90% CI [.00, .025]; robust *BIC* = 5905.279), $\Delta\chi^2(14) = 20.61, p = .112$.

Supplemental Table 14: Study 4 effects of condition on key outcomes assessed by sub-year in which the study was conducted

	Year 1			Year 2		
	CA Restriction Condition y[95% CI]	Resource Inequality Condition y[95% CI]	Interaction y[95% CI]	CA Restriction Condition y[95% CI]	Resource Inequality Condition y[95% CI]	Interaction y[95% CI]
Collective Autonomy Restriction	4.08[3.77,4.39]***	-.18[-.49,.13]	.01[-.61,.63]	4.24[3.99,4.49]***	.19[-.06,.44]	.02[-.48,.51]
Exploitation	1.53[1.17,1.90]***	2.04[1.67,2.41]***	-2.25[-2.99, -1.52]***	1.40[1.08,1.70]***	2.58[2.27,2.90]***	-2.27[-2.90, -1.65]***
Hostile Emotions	1.02[.66, 1.20]***	.99[.65, 1.34]***	-.59[-1.29,.10]	1.35[1.07, 1.64]***	.63[.35, .92]***	-.41[-.98,.17]
Collective Action Support	.93[.65,1.19]***	.56[.29,.83]***	-.30[-.84,.24]	.77[.52,1.01]***	.60[.35,.85]***	-.93[-1.43,-.43]***
System Justification	-1.21[-1.51,-.90]***	-.95[-1.25,-.64]***	.74[.14,1.34]*	-1.01[-1.25,-.76]***	-1.00[-1.25,-.75]***	.91[.42,1.41]***

	Year 1			Year 2		
	CA Restriction Condition b[95% CI]	Resource Inequality Condition b[95% CI]	Interaction b[95% CI]	CA Restriction Condition b[95% CI]	Resource Inequality Condition b[95% CI]	Interaction b[95% CI]
Rebellious Behaviour (Group)	7.92[2.29,37.71]**	7.92[2.29,37.71]**	-	2.77[.91,13.31]	3.41[1.23,16.38] ^λ	.20[.20,1.86]
Verbal Dissent (Group)	11.07[6.13,23.66]***	2.00[1.09,4.52]*	.24[.05, .79]*	15.94[8.22,38.65]***	1.81[.90,4.34]	.32[.06, 1.29]

Note. Results were derived from univariate regressions. We report results for each year if the outcome was measured during both years. Unstandardized slope coefficients for rebellious behaviour and verbal dissent are unstandardized exp(b) values. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .01$, ^λ $p < .10$.

Supplemental Table 15: Study 4 p-values adjusted for false discovery using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure (assuming 12 repeated tests)

Outcome	Uncorrected p value	Corrected p value
Collective Autonomy Restriction (Ind)	2.00E-16***	4.80E-16***
General Exploitation (Ind)	2.00E-16***	4.80E-16***
Hostile Emotions (Ind)	2.00E-16***	4.80E-16***
System Justification (Ind)	2.00E-16***	4.80E-16***
Verbal Dissent (Grp)	2.00E-16***	4.80E-16***
Hostile Emotions (Grp)	6.73E-13***	1.35E-12***
System Justification (Grp)	1.55E-06***	2.66E-06***
Collective Action (Grp)	8.61E-06***	1.29E-05***
Collective Action (Ind)	6.83E-04***	9.11E-04***
Rebellious Behavior (Grp)	4.94E-03**	5.93E-03**
Group Identification (Ind)	0.392	.427
Group Agency (Ind)	0.608	.608

Note. ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.